We study service fee and network size competition in an ATM market between an incumbent and an independent deployer, and its optimal regulation. We also analyze an actual regulation of such a market by competition authorities in Finland. Compared with the first-best regulation, we find unregulated foreign and interchange fees too high and an unregulated size of the incumbent's ATM network too small. However, if network sizes cannot be directly regulated, then competitive fees may also be too low from the welfare point of view. The Finnish regulation caps the incumbent's foreign fee which, according to our model, results in an increased interchange fee and a larger ATM network. In contrast with the actual regulation, it would also be essential to regulate the interchange fee.
Introduction
The Finnish Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) market was long dominated by a monopoly deployer owned by the major Finnish banks. The use of cash at the daily point-of-sale transactions has been declining relatively fast, and the incumbent deployer was cutting back its ATM network. In 2008, however, an independent ATM service operator or deployer (IAD) entered the market and several other IADs were poised to enter. The subsequent competition resulted in a fee structure that attracted interest by the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA). In its decision of 2009 the FCA caps the foreign (on-other's) fee charged by the incumbent deployer but leaves other fees and ATM network sizes unregulated. In this paper we build a simple model to study service fee and network size competition and its optimal regulation in an ATM market where an incumbent deployer encounters an IAD. We then compare the optimal regulation suggested by our model with the actual regulation implemented by the FCA.
While our model is inspired by the Finnish case, our analysis and results ought to be of more general interest: The ATM industry poses challenges for regulators and competition authorities around the world, as neither free competition nor an unregulated monopoly protected from entry is likely to yield socially optimal outcome in ATM markets. The ATM industry is also of inherent interests to Central Banks given their statutory duty to ensure smooth operation of payment systems. For that reason, for example, the Reserve Bank of Australia also acts as the regulator of the Australian ATM market, and in 2009 it implemented a major ATM fee reform that eliminated foreign and interchange fees. More generally the way cash supply is organized is not inconsequential for the economy as a whole: Schmiedel et al. (2012) estimate that the social costs of cash payments represent nearly half of the total social costs of providing retail payments, which amount almost to 1% of GDP in Europe.
We find unregulated fees unambiguously too high compared with the firstbest social optimum. We also find that unregulated competition results in too weak investment incentives for the incumbent deployer. In contrast the IAD may overinvest in its network. However, if a regulatory authority cannot directly control ATM network sizes, the optimal second-best regulation may even call for increased fee levels so as to encourage network investments. As the socially optimal first-best and second-best regulations imply negative profits for at least one of the deployers, we also characterize the optimal Ramsey regulation.
Our model predicts that the FCA decision to cap the incumbent's foreign fee, while reducing the level of the foreign fee, increases the level of the interchange fee. The regulation has no impact on the incumbent's investment incentives but will create an expansion of the IAD's ATM network. As a result, the total size of the ATM network increases. Nonetheless, since our model suggests that the incumbent deployer internalizes the effects of its foreign fee on consumer usage of the IAD's network and has little incentive to set a high foreign fee to foreclose the IAD, we consider the FCA's focus on the regulation of the foreign fee somewhat misplaced. It would be more essential to regulate the interchange fee. To obtain the first best, the foreign fee can be left unregulated if the interchange fee is set at the optimal level but the reverse does not apply.
There is an extensive empirical and theoretical literature on the competition in ATM industry (see McAndrews 2003 for a survey of the early literature). An emphasis in the theoretical literature has been on the role of the interchange fee set by card-issuing banks in the interaction of banking and ATM market (see, e.g. Dubec 2006, 2009; Chioveanu et al. 2009; Wenzel 2014 for recent contributions). We abstract from this much studied question because banks charge neither interchange nor direct fees for the use of their shared ATM network in Finland. As explained in detail in Section 2 this renders the link between the banking and ATM market much more indirect and weaker than in the environments studied in the literature.
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature that studies the effects of IADs on ATM deployment incentives and welfare in a spatial competition framework. In important articles, Donze and Dubec (2011) and Wenzel (2014) study the effects of the entry of IADs on competition for bank customers among cardissuing banks. In contrast, we study the post-entry competition for ATM customers between vertically differentiated ATM deployers, and the optimal regulation of such competition. Furthermore, in the recent literature (including Donze and Dubec 2011; Wenzel 2014 ) the benefits of an ATM network are assumed to directly enter into the consumers' utility function whereas we, inspired by Alexandrov (2008) , assume that an increase in an ATM network size reduces consumers' traveling costs to the nearest ATM. Also, Donze and Dubec (2011) focus on an Australian-style direct pricing of ATM cash withdrawals, Wenzel (2014) also considers a United Kingdom-style pricing based on interchange fees within a shared network, but we analyze yet another pricing regime used in Finland.
As ATMs constitute a differentiated product industry with primary characteristics being location of machines, competition for ATM customers among deployers is often modeled spatially (see, e.g. Massoud and Bernhardt 2002 for an elegant example). However, spatial competition among deployers is seldom employed in the study of the effects of IADs. One notable exception is Croft and Spencer (2004) . Compared with their work, we abstract from surcharges and account fees, but allow for vertical differentiation of ATMs and investments in an ATM network, and consider optimal regulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the key characteristics of the Finnish ATM market. We develop the model in Section 3, and use it to study optimal regulation in Section 4. In Section 5 we use the results of Sections 3 and 4 to evaluate the decision of the FCA. Conclusions are in Section 6.
Institutional Environment
The use of cash at the daily point-of-sale transactions has been decreasing fast in Finland: for example, surveys indicate that the use of cash as the most typical way of paying for daily consumer goods and services decreased by roughly 50% between 1999 and 2008. But it remains an important method of paying (see Hyytinen and Takalo 2009 for payment habits in Finland). The use of cash is often preceded by the use of an ATM. For example, getting "cash back" when paying with a card (say, at a retail store) was very rare before this decade. Using ATMs is easy, since virtually everyone has a banking account where incomes are credited directly and an ATM compatible card. The amount of cash withdrawn from ATMs rose up to the launch of euro notes, peaking at 17.4 billion euros in 2003, and has since then decreased slightly.
The Pre-Entry Evolution of the Finnish ATM Market
As indicated by Ferrari et al. (2010) , the evolution of the Finnish ATM market has been similar to many other continental European countries but different than in the UK or in the US in some key dimensions: the number of ATM networks, their ownership structure and investment coordination, and consumer retail fees for ATM withdrawals. In particular, prior to the entry of the new independent ATM deployer, consumers incurred no direct fees for ATM cash withdrawals.
The first ATMs were introduced in 1971 in Finland. While the first network was operated jointly by the banks, later banking groups operated their own networks, which were not compatible with each others. ATM networks were remade compatible in 1990 in the aftermath of deregulation of banking sector. The subsequent banking crisis of the early 1990s expanded the coverage of ATM networks, because the banks replaced their branches by ATMs to cut down costs.
The major Finnish banks formed a joint venture, Automatia Pankkiautomaatit Plc, to run their ATM networks in 1994. This cooperation required an authorization from the FCA. The ATMs in the shared network were labeled as "Otto." In 2001, smaller banks that had remained outside the joint venture became its customers, and since 2004 Automatia owned and operated all ATMs in Finland.
Automatia owns all the ATMs and decides their number in the shared network. It has been cutting back the coverage of the ATM network over its entire existence (see Figure 1 ). There were 1658 ATMs in Finland at the beginning of 2008, which is a low number by European standards even in relation to population.
Competition and Pricing of ATM Cash Withdrawals
Up to 2008 Automatia operated as a monopoly, but in March 2008 Eurocash Finland Plc (a subsidiary of Kontanten Plc, a large independent Swedish ATM deployer) entered the Finnish ATM market by introducing its own ATMs (labeled as "Nosto"). The plan was to introduce more than 500 new machines. At the same , 1995-2014. time, two other IADs announced their plans to enter into the Finnish ATM market. For example, Suomen Käteisnosto Plc, owned by high-profile Finnish businessmen, announced a launch of an independent ATM network in cooperation with First Data Corporation, a major player in international retail payment infrastructure and data processing market. However, the plans of the other entrants have failed to materialize so far. Similarly, Eurocash has failed to expand its network according to its initial plans -there were only 56 Nosto-ATMs in Finland at the beginning of 2014 (see Figure 1) . That competition has remained more limited than what was thought at the time of entry might be due to fees on the use of entrant's ATMs levied by the banks using Automatia's services and issuing payment cards. These feesso called foreign fees -initially consisted of a fixed amount of one euro per transaction plus a variable amount ranging from 0.75% to 2% of the value withdrawal, depending on the card-issuing bank. The introduction of the foreign fees prompted Suomen Käteisnosto to file a complaint to the FCA. Subsequently the FCA imposed an upper limit on the level of a foreign fee which virtually eliminated the heterogeneity in foreign fees among banks. We study the FCA's decision in more detail in Section 6. In what follows we focus on competition between the incumbent, Automatia, and the sole entrant, Eurocash. Eurocash's stated rationale for the entry is that there are too few ATMs in Finland, and it aims at giving the consumers easy and secure access to cash and 1 To understand this competition, we have not only resorted to the material available from public sources but also interviewed industry practitioners and experts at Automatia, the Bank of Finland, the FCA, and the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority.
to be present in high traffic locations in Finland. Eurocash's sole business is cash supply via ATMs. It is involved in issuing neither ATM compatible payment cards nor other payment media.
In contrast the incumbent Otto.-network is, as mentioned, owned by the dominant banks in Finland. These banks provide multiple services, e.g., they are the main issuers of payment media in Finland, including cash via bank branches and ATM compatible payment cards. Traditionally the banks in Finland have provided cash distribution as a complementary, free service to their customers. The Bank of Finland (Nyandoto 2011) estimates the banks' annual losses from cash distribution to be around 110 billion euros in 2009. However, cash distribution via ATMs create complex indirect benefits and costs for banks. Prior research (e.g. Ferrari et al. 2010; Verdier 2012) suggests that, on the one hand, ATM services may generate cost savings for banks if their customers withdraw cash from ATMs rather than from bank branches but, on the other hand, greater availability of ATM services may also reduce bank revenues from payment card usage if this dilutes customers' incentive to use cards.
The differences in the deployers' business models may partially explain the differences in the pricing of ATM use. From consumer point of view, the pricing strategies are relatively simple but, in the case of the IAD's Nosto-machines, not necessarily transparent. For example, the Finnish Consumer Agency (2011) urged card issuing banks and Eurocash to increase transparency of fees charged for the use of Nosto-machines. Contracts between banks and Automatia do not restrict the banks' service fee setting. However, no bank charges their cardholders for the use of Otto.-ATMs, i.e., the on-us fee is zero. But, as mentioned, the banks charge their customers for using Eurocash's Nosto-ATM network, i.e., there is a positive foreign fee. Since the IAD is not issuing cards, it does not have members of its own. The IAD is not charging customers for the use of its Nosto-ATMs, i.e., Eurocash does not surcharge. But Eurocash receives interchange fee payments from banks according to their cardholders' use of Nosto-machines.
2 A major component of this interchange fee comes from the interchange fee rules for ATM cash withdrawals of international payment card companies such as American Express, Diners, MasterCard and Visa. When setting these interchange fee rules, the payment card companies may take into account local market conditions, resulting in countryspecific interchange fee rules.
In contrast to many other countries with similar ATM network evolution, there is no interchange fee in the banks' shared network. To fund its operations, Automatia charges a fixed membership fee and a transaction-based fee from banks. There is an additional fee for a local bank (branch) if a traffic level of an ATM in its local area is less than half of the average ATM traffic (roughly 8000 withdrawals per month in 2012). Automatia's profits, if any, are distributed to the owner banks that have equal ownership shares.
These ATM pricing strategies render the link between ATM market and banking market more diluted in Finland than in many other countries. Since there are no direct charges for the use of Automatia's ATMs, consumers' choice of a bank hardly depends on their ATM use. 3 The absence of an interchange fee from the shared network limits the banks' possibilities to use ATM pricing to soften competition. From the point of view of a cardholder's bank, transaction-based fees charged by Automatia work like interchange fees by raising the marginal cost of acquiring an additional customer. But this effect is countered by the additional fee for little used ATMs. Furthermore, there are no similar interchange-fee type revenues accruing to banks in the Finnish case.
Besides business models, ATMs themselves are different between the rival deployers. They have different colors and user interfaces. Thanks to a different user interface and rapidly increasing number of fraud cases associated with the use of the incumbent's Otto.-machines, the IAD's Nosto-machines may be perceived to be more secure to use by consumers. Partially because of these security concerns, Automatia has been upgrading its Otto.-machines from the beginning of 2012. Moreover, the incumbent's machines distribute only EUR 20 and EUR 50 notes whereas IAD's machines also allow for withdrawals of EUR 10 notes.
A Model of Differentiated ATM Deployer Competition
In this section we build a model of service fee and network size competition between two differentiated ATM deployers that employ different pricing strategies and ATMs, taking the institutional features of the Finnish ATM market as given (see the previous section). Consider two deployers indexed i = B, I that compete for a unit mass of consumers that are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line. We assume that the deployers' ATMs are located at opposite ends of the line. For clarity, we interpret the horizontal differentiation between the deployers' ATM networks as a spatial dimension rather than as a taste dimension. As will be specified below, building a larger network allows a deployer to reduce the consumer traveling costs to the nearest ATM in the deployer's network.
To obtain a network size s i , deployer i needs to incur an investment cost K(s i ) where K(·) is a function. We assume that K′ > 0 and K″ > 0, i.e., increasing the network size is increasingly costly. In particular, we assume that K(·) is always sufficiently convex to ensure that the total size of the ATM network, S≡s B +s I , is strictly below unity. Furthermore, we assume that there is a minimum network size. This minimum size could arise from regulation or there might be a minimum efficient scale for an ATM network. For brevity, we normalize this minimum size to zero for both networks, i.e., the standard Hotelling model of measure zero networks is a special case where both deployers operate a network of a minimum size (see a working paper version, Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Takalo 2012, for an analysis of this standard case). We assume that K(0) = K′(0) = 0 so that there may be an incentive to expand a network beyond its minimum size. 4 To obtain an explicit formula for the optimal network size we use the standard quadratic cost function 2 ( ) / 2 i i K s ks = where k > 0 is a constant shifting the cost function. At the limit where k→∞ we obtain the standard model of measure zero networks.
Our approach of modeling ATM network competition has a drawback that the total ATM network costs and benefits do not only depend on the total size of the ATM network but also on its division between the deployers. While similar considerations are present in many other oligopoly models, it may be unrealistic to think that increased competition necessarily reduces the diseconomies of scale in the costs of expanding an ATM network.
5 However the concern is less relevant 4 It would be possible to generalize the model to allow the minimum network size to be positive for one or both of the deployers but this would only introduce an additional parameter without any substantial insights. Similarly, we could assume that K(·) differs between the deployers but for brevity we abstract from this complication. As will be shown below, however, despite the identical cost function the network sizes generally differ in equilibrium due to the differences in pricing policies and machine technologies. 5 Yet, competition may reduce the diseconomies of scale in the costs since a deployer's cash supply chain management becomes increasingly more complex with the deployer's network size. Also, competition may increase the number of cash centers for a given total network size, and thereby reduce the cash-in-transit costs.
here as we are not interested in studying the optimal structure of an ATM market but its optimal regulation given its duopoly structure. The deployers' ATMs are technologically compatible but deployer B is operated by card issuing banks while deployer I is an IAD. In other words, deployer B is the sole issuer of ATM cards. Reminiscent of Ferrari et al. (2010) , we assume that deployer B maximizes the banks' joint profits. Therefore we do not make a difference between deployer B and the banks operating it unless otherwise indicated.
Following the market practice in Finland, we assume that deployer B charges no on-us fee nor does deployer I surcharge. As a result, the sole pricing variable used by deployer B is a foreign fee, denoted by f, which is the price charged by deployer B for the use of the rival's ATMs. Similarly, deployer I can only obtain revenues by receiving interchange fee payments from deployer B for the use of its ATM machines. We denote the interchange (access) fee by a, and assume that it is set by deployer I so as to maximize its profits.
6 Note that because deployer B issues all cards, surcharges by deployer B and on-us and foreign fees by deployer I are immaterial. We also abstract from banks' account fees. 7 We consider a four stage game where, as in Wenzel (2014) , the deployers first choose the size of their networks simultaneously. In the second stage, deployer I sets an interchange fee and, then, deployer B chooses a foreign fee. This sequential timing of price setting follows the literature (e.g. Laffont et al. 1998; Croft and Spencer 2004; Donze and Dubec 2006) . From a practical point of view, such timing could be motivated because wholesale ATM fees (e.g. the fallback rules of international payment card companies) may be more difficult to change than retail fees. Finally, in the fourth stage, consumers choose an ATM network to withdraw cash. We look for subgame perfect equilibria, solving the game backwards.
For simplicity, it is assumed that each consumer makes just one withdrawal and hence the number of consumers is a proxy for the number of transactions. Consider a consumer who is at some location x∈[0, 1] on the unit line. If she withdraws cash from an ATM belonging to network B, her utility is given by
6 Alternatively we could think that the interchange fee is chosen by international payment card companies in so far they take into account the IAD's profits and the incumbent deployer's strategic actions. 7 As argued in Section 2, since there are no direct usage nor interchange fees in the shared network, the link between banking and ATM market is diluted in the Finnish environment. Nonetheless, analysing the effects of the Automatia's complex wholesale fee practices on banking market competition is an interesting topic for further research. and in case she withdraws cash from network I, her utility (gross of a foreign fee) is given by
In equations (1) and (2), M i , denotes the incremental utility received by each consumer from using an ATM of deployer i, i∈{B, I}. We allow the deployers' ATMs be vertically differentiated: A consumer may receive a different incremental utility depending on the ATM type from which the consumer withdraws cash. Parameter t is a unit traveling cost (disutility of not getting cash immediately).
Equations (1) and (2) show how a larger network reduces consumer traveling costs. If a consumer is located within a network, her traveling costs are eliminated entirely. It is assumed that M I and M B are sufficiently large so that in equilibrium market is fully covered. Thus the marginal consumer located at x * is indifferent between the two deployers, i.e., x
where f is, as explained, a foreign fee charged by deployer B for the use of deployer I's ATMs. To find out x * , note first that, as in Alexandrov (2008), the consumer's net utility functions u B (x) and u I (x)-f cannot intersect in a location inside a network; otherwise, a deployer could reduce its network size without affecting its demand. Thus the marginal consumer x * must be located between the networks, in the interval (s B , 1-s I ). That is, to determine x * , we can use the first rows of equations (1) and (2) 
where ΔM≡M I -M B captures the difference between the service quality of deployer I's and B's ATMs and Δs≡s I -s B measures the difference in the deployer's network sizes. The network size difference will be determined as a part of equilibrium but M I and M B are exogenous parameters whose difference can be either positive or negative. We postpone the discussion of an empirically plausible sign of ΔM to the end of this section. Note that equation (3) 
Clearly, having a larger network than its rival helps a deployer to obtain a larger share of the market. Note that (1-Δs)/2 is the half-way between the two networks. Thus, if f equals ΔM, the marginal consumer is located at the point where the minimum distance to each network is the same. 
where a, as mentioned, is the interchange (access) fee paid by deployer B to deployer I, and c B ≥ 0 denotes the direct cost an ATM withdrawal causes to deployer B, e.g., due to supply of cash and maintenance of machines. The first term on the the right-hand side of equation (5) hence captures the costs caused to deployer B by withdrawals from its own ATM machines. The second term comes from the net revenues derived from cash withdrawals of cardholders from the rival's ATMs. The third term shows the costs of network investments. As discussed in Section 2, besides the direct costs captured by c B , ATM withdrawals involve complex opportunity costs for the banks operating deployer B. On the one hand, greater availability of ATMs may lead to cost savings if it encourages the banks' customers to use ATMs rather than service desks to withdraw cash but, on the other hand, cash use may reduce the banks' revenues from payment cards. However, because these indirect benefits and costs of ATM withdrawals are generated irrespective of the ATM network used by the banks' customers, they would amount to a fixed term in the profit function of deployer B and can hence be ignored from equation (5).
8 Also, equation (5) shows how we for simplicity assume that a cardholder use of deployer I's machines causes no other costs to deployer B besides interchange fee payments.
9
In stage three, deployer B chooses the foreign fee f to maximize its objective function (5), taking the interchange fee and network sizes as given. The first-order condition 10 is given by
8 Adding such a fixed term in the deployer B's profit function would quantitatively affect the results in Section 4.3 where we analyze the optimal Ramsey pricing. 9 In practice, while interchange fees constitute the main part of the banks' costs stemming from their cardholders' use of the IAD's machines, there are some other costs such as routing costs (a switch fee). In Finland, switch fees are paid to a third party and are therefore less of a concern for our analysis. 10 Unless otherwise indicated, the second-order conditions for the maximization problems automatically hold.
Since ∂X B /∂f > 0, an increase in the foreign fee increases (decreases) demand for the deployer B's (I's) services, as some consumers shift from deployer I to deployer B. The first term in equation (6) captures costs caused to deployer B by the increased use of its machines. The second term shows how the shrinkage of the deployer I's demand reduces the deployer B's net revenues from the use of the rival's ATMs. The last term depicts marginal revenues from a higher foreign fee. Using equation (3) to solve equation (6) for f gives
( 1 ) ( , , ) . 2
This reaction function of deployer B is increasing in the interchange fee and the network size difference.
In stage two, the deployer I chooses the interchange fee a so as to maximize its objective function 2 ( , , , ) ( , , )( ) , 2
subject to the deployer B's reaction function (7). Equation (8) shows how deployer I obtains revenues from interchange fees, and incurs costs from withdrawals of its ATM machines, with c I ≥ 0 denoting the cost an ATM withdrawal causes to deployer I, as well as from investments in network size. The first-order condition for the deployer I's problem reads as
In equation (9), the first term comes from ∂π I /∂f * (df/da) and shows how an increase in the interchange fee prompts deployer B to raise its foreign fee due to strategic complementarity of the fees, which decreases demand for the deployer I's ATMs (as ∂X I /∂f < 0). The second term captures marginal revenues from the increased interchange fee.
Using equations (4) and (7) to solve the first-order condition (9) for a gives
( 1 ) ( , ) . 
Then, substitution of a(s B , s I ) from equation (10) for a in equation (7) yields
where Δc≡c I -c B depicts the difference in the costs of withdrawals from different ATMs. Like service quality difference ΔM, the cost difference can be either positive or negative. 11 We postpone the discussion of the sign of Δc to the end of the section.
Substituting equation (11) for equations (3) and (4) yields the market shares for given network sizes as 7 ( , ) 8 8
and 1 ( , ) . 8 8
Equations (12) and (13) imply that the deployers' market shares are non-negative only if
In what follows we assume that condition (14) holds. From equations (8) and (10) we also see that condition (14) is enough to guarantee that a(s B , s I ) ≥ c I and thereby that π I (a, s I , f, s B ) ≥ 0.
After inserting equations (10)-(13) into equations (5) and (8) 
In stage one the deployers simultaneously choose their network sizes so as to maximize their profits as given by equations (15) 
This characterizes the optimal size of network I if the second-order condition 2 2 <0, 8
holds. When equation (18) holds, the latter inequality in the assumption (14) implies that the nominator of equation (17) must be non-negative in equilibrium, i.e., that
Thus, because of equations (18) and (19), we must have 0.
c I s ≥ Equation (17) reveals that the equilibrium size of network I is increasing in t and ΔM, and decreasing in Δc and k as one could expect.
We also need to ensure that < 1, 
To understand the properties of the equilibrium fees, it is first helpful to consider the case of measure zero networks [e.g. by letting s I = s B = 0 in equations (10) and (11)]. This reveals the direct effect of the service quality and cost parameters M I , M B , c I , c B , and t on the ATM fees. In line with a standard Hotelling's model, the direct effects of ΔM, c B , and c I on the equilibrium interchange fee a c are positive. In contrast, while the direct effect of the rival's cost c I on the equilibrium foreign fee f c is also positive, the direct effects of own costs and the relative service quality of deployer B are negative. This is nonetheless intuitive upon recalling that deployer B wishes to encourage the use of its rival's ATMs so as to avoid costs caused by withdrawals from its own network. In the case of measure zero networks, both ATM charges are increasing in consumer traveling costs (as usually in a Hotelling's model, equilibrium prices increase with traveling costs). Parameters M I , M B , c I , c B , and t also have an indirect effect on the fees via the size of network I. Equations (10) and (11) show that the ATM fees are increasing in the size of network I because a larger network size makes network I more attractive from the consumer point of view [hence, by using equation (19), we can show that a c and f c are decreasing in the network investment cost k]. From equation (17) we can observe that the indirect effect of ΔM amplifies its direct effect on the fees: an increase in ΔM encourages deployer I to expand its network, which prompts the deployers to increase their fees further. Similarly, the indirect effect of c B on a c merely reinforces its direct effect. In the case of the remaining parameters, however, the indirect effect operates into the reverse direction than the direct effect. For example, an increase in c I weakens the deployer I's network investment incentives, which pushes the fees downwards, diluting the positive direct effect of c I on the fees. By using equations (19) and (20) s from equation (17) for Δs in equations (12) and (13) yields the deployers' equilibrium market shares as
and
The deployer I's equilibrium market share is increasing in the service quality difference ΔM, and decreasing in the cost difference Δc and the network investment cost k. The reverse applies for the deployer B's market share. After substitution of c I s from equation (17) for Δs in equation (14) we observe that equations (14) and (18) guarantee that X I ≥ 0 and X B ≥ 0.
Similarly, after substituting c I s from equation (17) for Δs in equations (15) and (16), the deployer's equilibrium profits can be written as 2 2 8
and 2 ( ) .
( 8 )
In words, the deployer I's profits are decreasing in the cost difference and the network investment cost, and increasing in the service quality difference, as one could expect. But because deployer B derives revenues from the use of the rival's ATMs, its profits are also increasing in the service quality difference, and decreasing in the network investment cost and the cost of withdrawing from the deployer I's ATMs. Note that in a model of measure zero networks, the effect of t on the deployers' profits would be positive and the effect of c B on π B negative [to see this, let, e.g., s I = s B = 0 in equations (15) and (16)], but now an increase in t or in c B increases the deployer I's incentives to expand its network [see equation (17)], rendering these profit effects ambiguous.
Equations (19) and (20) guarantee that π I ≥ 0, but we also want to assume π B ≥ 0. From equation (25), we observe that since c B ≥ 0, this imposes a more stringent restriction on parameter values than equation (19) . As a result, we have the following restriction on parameter values:
In equation (27) the first inequality comes from equation (14) [after substitution of c I s from equation (17) for Δs], and the second inequality from π B ≥ 0. In sum, we have only two restrictions on parameter values, equations (20) and (27), which imply that =0, (23)- (26) show, the equilibrium market shares and profits crucially depend on the differences in service qualities and costs of ATM withdrawals. Based on Section 2, it is plausible to think that in our institutional environment, ΔM ≥ 0, because the deployer I's machines carry a larger variety of notes and might be perceived more secure. But these features may also imply that Δc ≥ 0, as maintaining more stringent security and a larger note variety may involve larger direct costs of withdrawals.
The difference ΔM-Δc can be thought of capturing relative efficiency of the deployers' ATMs. Equations (23) and (24) show that if the deployers' ATMs are approximately equally efficient, deployer B captures at most 7/8 of the market in equilibrium and deployer I receives at least 1/8 of the market (as we have lim 1/ 8, k I X →∞ = dX I /dk < 0, and X B = 1-X I ). Deployer I has an incentive to set a high interchange fee, since this will not affect consumers' choices directly. However, a high interchange fee prompts deployer B to raise its foreign fee due to strategic complementarity. This discourages consumers from using the deployer I's ATMs. In response, deployer I expands its ATM network which increases its market share from 1/8. Nonetheless, with ΔM = Δc, the condition (20) is equivalent to k > t/4, which is sufficient to keep the deployer B's equilibrium market share larger. But even if deployer B is enjoying a larger market share its profits are likely to be smaller than the profits of deployer I: from equations (25) and (26) we observe that π B = π I (4k/(8k-t))-c B , i.e., a sufficient condition for π B ≤ π I is k ≥ t/4 which, as mentioned, we deem to hold. The smaller profits of deployer B are unsurprising given that it is charging no on-us fee and is thus making losses from cash withdrawals from its own machines.
Welfare and Regulation
Social welfare arising from the ATM market is given by 
The first and second term on the right-hand side of equation (28) As equation (28) shows, welfare does not directly depend on the ATM charges, since they merely represent transfers between consumers and the deployers. Welfare, however, indirectly depends on the fees as they affect how the market is shared between the deployers [recall from equations (3) and (7) that X B is increasing in f which in turn is increasing in a]. The fees also affect the deployers' incentives to expand their ATM networks.
The First-Best Regulation
Analogous to Ferrari et al. (2010) , we characterize the first-best regulation where a regulatory authority can determine the fees a and f, as well as the network sizes s B and s I . To derive a socially optimal foreign fee, we maximize social welfare as given by equation (28) 
The first-best foreign fee f * should be positive if the cost difference is positive, i.e., if the deployer B's machines are more cost efficient than the deployer I's machines. In such situations the increase in the use of the deployer B's machines decreases the total cost of ATM use, and it is socially optimal to increase f to promote the use of the deployer B's ATMs at the expense of the deployer I's ATMs.
If f is fixed at some level, and the regulatory authority can control the network sizes, the question of an optimal interchange fee is moot, as a affects welfare only via f. Seeking an optimal interchange fee makes more sense if the foreign fee is contingent on a. We may implement the socially optimal fees by leaving the foreign fee unregulated at f(a, s B , s I ) as given by equation (7) and then determining an optimal interchange fee. Setting f(a, s B , s I ) equal to f * = Δc and solving for a yields ( , )
.
When comparing the unregulated fees a c and f c of equations (21) and (22) to the socially optimal fees a * (s I , s B ) and f * of equations (30) and (29), we can show by using the conditions (20) and (27) ≥ f * , i.e., the unregulated fees are higher than the first-best fees. Note that the result arises irrespective of the regulated sizes of the networks.
To find socially optimal network sizes, we maximize equation (28) with respect to s B and s I . Using equation (3) and some algebra, the first-order condition for the optimal size of network B can be written as ( 1 ) 2 
After solving this system of two equations and two unknowns we obtain the socially optimal network sizes as
and 1 max , 0 . 2
The socially optimal sizes of the networks have intuitive properties. In particular, if ΔM > ( < )Δc, the network I's machines are welfare-superior (inferior) to the network B's machines and therefore the size of network I should be larger (smaller) than the size of network B. Note that 0 B s * ≥ whereas 0.
c B s = In words, competition tends to result in a smaller size of network B than what would be desirable from the welfare point of view. In contrast the unregulated size of network I may be larger or smaller than the socially optimal one. 13 We summarize the results concerning the first-best regulation as follows:
Proposition 1
The socially optimal foreign and interchange fees, and network sizes are given by f * = Δc, While the rule for the first-best foreign fee is appealingly simple, the model suggests that there is little rationale to regulate the foreign fee alone without regulating the interchange fee simultaneously. Too see this, note that if the foreign fee is regulated at some fixed level but deployer I is allowed choose the interchange fee freely, the interchange fee will be "as high as possible": when choosing the interchange fee, deployer I no longer needs to take into account the response by deployer B. In contrast, when the network sizes are regulated at the optimal level, it would be enough to regulate the interchange fee only: if the interchange fee is set to the optimal level a * , deployer B would choose the first-best foreign fee f * automatically. Note also from equations (31) and (32) that at least one of the deployers should always expand its network beyond the minimum size. When the difference |ΔM-Δc| is not too large relative to k, both networks should have strictly positive sizes. In this range of parameter values, we have that This expression for the socially optimal interchange fee a * makes sense. As an interchange fee discourages consumers from using the deployer I's ATMs due to the strategic complementarity of the fees, the interchange fee should be increased if relative efficiency of the deployer B's ATMs improves. If the service quality and cost differences roughly cancel out each other, the optimal interchange fee is simply given by the difference between the cost of a withdrawal from the deployer I's machines and consumer traveling cost.
The Second-Best Regulation
We next consider the second-best regulation where only the fees f and a can be regulated. This, too, follows Ferrari et al. (2010) .
14 For the moment we ignore the deployers' zero profit constraints. The events now unfold as follows. First, the regulatory authority chooses a and f. Second, the deployers simultaneously choose the network sizes s B and s I . Third, consumers choose an ATM network to withdraw cash.
Since the last stage is unchanged, the market shares of the deployers are given by equations (3) 
Note from equations (33) and (34) that both network sizes are increasing in the interchange fee a whereas the size of network B is decreasing in the foreign fee f. For network I, interchange fee revenues encourage to build a larger network. For network B, a larger network reduces its cardholders' use of the rival network and thereby interchange fee payments. In contrast, foreign fee revenues prompt deployer B to cut back its network so as to push consumers to use the rival network.
Proceeding to stage one, the regulatory authority's problem is to choose a and f so as to maximize equation (28) 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
From Propositions 1 and 2 we observe that both the first-and second-best regulation aim at the same total size of the ATM network, i.e., S * = S ** = t/(t+k)∈(0, 1) However, the deployer-specific network sizes differ between the first-and second-best regulation if ΔM≠Δc since
Thus if ΔM > ( < )Δc the difference in the first-best network sizes is larger (smaller) than the difference in the second-best sizes. Similarly, we have
To understand these results, recall from equations (33) and (34) that s B (f, a) is decreasing in f whereas s I (a) is independent of f. If ΔM-Δc > 0, the network I's ATMs are welfare-superior. The regulatory authority wants to implement a higher foreign fee than in the first best because this means that deployer B will reduce its network.
As to the second-best interchange fee, it can be shown that it is higher than in the first best (a ** ≥ c I ≥ a * ). 15 If the regulatory authority cannot directly control network sizes the first-best interchange fee would result in too small network sizes (in the case of network I it is easy to see that s I (a * ) = 0 because a * ≤ c I ). Therefore, the regulatory authority must raise the interchange fee to stimulate network investments by both deployers. Note that when the second-best fees are higher than the first-best fees, it is no longer clear that they would be smaller than the unregulated fees. We return to this point at the end of the next subsection.
The Ramsey Regulation (Third-Best Regulation)
So far we have ignored the deployers' zero-profit constraints. This is not innocuous: for example, deployer I will not balance its budget under the first-best regulation because a * ≤ c I . We now consider the optimal regulation of the ATM fees under the constraint that both deployers at minimum earn zero-profits. Taking into account this constraint complicates the analysis of the previous subsection somewhat. Given that c I ≥ a * it is obvious that the Ramsey pricing always calls for a higher interchange fee than in the first best. Although the Ramsey pricing also calls for a higher foreign fee than in the first best, it does not render network expansion profitable for deployer B. In contrast the Ramsey pricing may provide stronger investment incentives for deployer I and, by implication, a more extensive total ATM network than unregulated competition.
To gain further understanding into the Ramsey regulation, let us consider a special case where c B = 0. Then Proposition 3 implies that f
Thus, both fees should be identical but larger than the cost of a withdrawal from network I. This would stimulate the deployer I's network investments, while keeping the foreign fee as low as possible and allowing both deployers to operate in the market.
Taken together, the results of Section 4 have an important implication. While unregulated fees are too high compared with the first-best fees, this policy conclusion may no longer hold if the regulatory authority cares about network sizes but only controls fees. For example, Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the regulated interchange fee should be higher than in the first best. In such a case, the question of whether unregulated fees are larger or smaller than the socially optimal fees generally depends on the ratio of k to t. For example, straightforward comparison of equations (44) and (21) i.e., for a sufficiently large ratio of k to t the regulatory authority intervening in an unregulated market should increase the interchange fee to encourage network investments.
Analysis of the FCA's Decision
As described in Section 2, the FCA launched an investigation on competition and pricing structure in the Finnish ATM market in 2008. The FCA's decision on the issue was published on June 18, 2009 (FCA 2009 ). The decision reveals concerns about the low number of ATMs in Finland, and the lack of competition in the market. The FCA worries that foreign fees charged by card-issuing banks are too high, and might foreclose entrants from the market, violating Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union about the abuse of dominant position. According to the FCA's decision the banks operating Automatia (the Otto.-ATM network) should not to price discriminate new deployers. The decision caps the foreign fee to be at most equal to the difference in the costs caused by a withdrawal from Automatia's ATMs and IADs' ATMs to a cardholder's bank.
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The FCA does not attempt to regulate other fees nor network sizes directly. In particular, the decision leaves the IADs' interchange fees unregulated. It appears that the FCA takes the IADs' interchange fees exogenous to the Finnish market, being decided by international payment card companies. 17 Nor is the on-us fee on the use of Otto.-ATMs regulated. It can be zero also in the future.
The FCA states that the cap on the foreign fee should make ATM cash withdrawals from new deployers cheaper to consumers, and this should encourage entry and expansion of new ATM networks. The resulting conditions should better meet customer preferences, and expand their possibilities to choose from different ATMs. A greater product differentiation between different networks could also be possible in future. The FCA also notes that as payment cards maybe becoming more expensive because of the concentration of payment cards 16 The FCA estimates that the cost difference is one euro when a Visa card is used to withdraw cash and 60-65 cents when a MasterCard withdrawal is made. 17 An exogenous interchange fee is a special case of our model where the interchange fee setting stage of the game is omitted.
industry following the introduction of the Single Euro Payments Area, it is important to ensure the availability of cash to maintain it as a relevant option to cards.
As we assume in our model that a cardholder's use of the IAD's machines causes no other costs to the cardholder's bank besides interchange fee payments, the FCA decision amounts to a requirement f ≤ a-c B in terms of our model. The model predicts that this cap on the foreign fee binds in equilibrium: The unregulated foreign fee given by equation (7) is larger than a-c B if a ≤ t(1+Δs)+ΔM+c B which, by using equation (10), is equivalent to the latter inequality in the restriction (14) .
Assuming that the cap binds, the FCA decision would mean in the context of our model that the incumbent deployer's revenue per withdrawal is -c B irrespective of the ATM network where withdrawals take place. As a result, this pricing implements the FCA's objective of no-discrimination in the sense that it is immaterial for the incumbent deployer whether consumers use the incumbent's or entrants' ATMs.
To determine the fee structure and network sizes resulting from the FCA decision in the context of our model, we calculate the deployers' network investments, and the IAD's interchange fee following the steps described in Section 3 but assuming that the incumbent's reaction function is given by f FCA (a) = a-c B instead of equation (7) Proof. In the Appendix. 
In words, the FCA regulation achieves some of its stated objectives: It makes the use of the IAD's ATMs cheaper to consumers and it encourages the IAD to expand its ATM network. As a result, our model predicts that the total size of the ATM network increases, too. The model also predicts that the IAD's market share more than doubles [see equation (47) in the Appendix].
Because an interchange fee has no direct effect on welfare and because the FCA regulation has no impact on the size of network B, the welfare effects of the regulation arise from the decrease in the foreign fee and the increase in the size of network I. These effects unambiguously increase consumer welfare -a key goal of any competition policy intervention. In terms of aggregate welfare, however, the net effect of the FCA regulation is less clear. Note first that the reduction in the equilibrium foreign fee caused by the regulation also increases aggregate welfare:
Δc under the restriction (19) and since the social welfare function (28) is concave in f and obtains the unique maximum at f = f * , welfare must be decreasing in f for all f ≥ f * . But the expansion of the IAD's ATM network has generally ambiguous welfare effects, as it may also lead to overinvestment.
As indicated by the Tinbergen rule, the regulation imposed by the FCA is not generally optimal, as with one instrument it is impossible to achieve multiple policy goals. The optimal second-best and Ramsey regulation would call for regulation of the interchange fee in addition to the foreign fee. The first-best would in addition warrant regulation of ATM investments (e.g. via non-distortionary subsidies as in Ferrari et al. 2010) . Even when the network sizes are not a regulatory concern and, as a result, there is only one policy target (the optimal sharing of the ATM market between the deployers), our analysis of Section 4 suggests that the FCA's regulation is likely to remain suboptimal since it leaves the interchange fee unregulated. Nonetheless, a useful feature of the FCA's cap is its contingency on the level of the interchange fee. Thus the interchange fee cannot be arbitrarily high as the reaction of the incumbent deployer should be taken into account when setting the interchange fee.
Conclusion
The Finnish ATM market was long dominated by a monopoly owned by the major Finnish card-issuing banks. The use of cash at the daily point-of-sale transactions has been declining, and the incumbent deployer was cutting back its ATM network. In 2008, however, an IAD entered in the market and several other independent deployers were poised to enter. The resulting ATM service fee structure led to an investigation by the FCA. In its decision the FCA caps foreign fees charged by the card-issuing banks but left the other fees and network sizes unregulated.
In this paper we build a simple model to study competition and regulation in an ATM market that takes some main institutional features of the Finnish environment as given. We find that unregulated duopoly competition yields too high ATM fees and too small investments in the incumbent network compared with the first-best social optimum. If a regulatory authority cannot control the network sizes directly, the optimal regulation of ATM fees becomes more nuanced, and might even call for increased interchange and foreign fees so as to encourage network investments.
Our model suggests that while the FCA decision pushes foreign fees downwards and, as a result, increases the total ATM network size and consumer welfare, it is suboptimal to regulate the foreign fees alone. In general, it is better to regulate at least the interchange fee, since the members of the incumbent network internalize the effects of their foreign fees on the consumer usage of the IAD's network and have little incentive to foreclose the IAD.
While our analysis is inspired by the Finnish ATM market, our results should be of interest to regulators and competition authorities in many other jurisdictions as ATMs operated by independent deployers are becoming commonplace. Much work, though, remains to be done in order to develop a broader vision of regulation of ATM markets where bank-owned deployers and IADs compete. In particular, future work should consider the effects of such regulation on substitution between cash and payment cards and on payment innovation incentives, building on the advances made by Verdier (2012) and Bourreau and Verdier (2013) .
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Comparing equations (40) and (41) with equations (31) and (32) 
From equations (43) and (44) 
